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Exculpato Agreements-A Dilemma For The Courts 
& A Problem For Society 
Each of us signs away our rights countless times every year. And anyone who 
thinks they have been cautious enough as to keep their rights, is more than likely mistaken. 
Anyone who has been to a golf course, a baseball game, a football game, a basketball 
game, a gym, or an amusement park has more than likely waived his or her rights to 
\ 
recover daniages as a result of injury. After one knowingly contracts away his or her 
rights, a question generally arises--Is the exculpation agreement) valid? Unfortunately, 
there is no clear answer to this question, as the border between admissible and 
inadmissible exculpatory clauses is ever shifting. 
Since there is no clear formula courts follow in determining whether an 
-exculpatory clause is admissible or inadmissible, exculpatory agreements have caused both 
a dilemma for the courts and a problem for society. Although courts have no clear 
formula they apply to determine whether or not an exculpatory contract will be upheld; a 
trJ careful examination of the types of exculpatory contracts that courts have traditionally 
trJ 
:5a held to be valid, as well as types of exculpatory contracts that courts have traditionally 
held to be invalid, will lead to a better understanding ofwhen a court will uphold or refuse 
to uphold an exculpatory contract. 
- IAn exculpation agreement is an agreement by which a party contracts away liabilty as a 
result of their negligence. 
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EXCULPATORY AGREEMENTS UPHELD BY COURTS 
The basis on which any exculpatory agreem~nt: m,;. be jheld is the basic right of 
the parties to contract. One llIinois case, Harris y (",J~~~s' forth the basis of the 
freedom to contract: "We start from our often-repeated axiom that '[p]ublic policy 
strongly favors freedom to contract, as is manifest in both the United States Constitution 
and our constitution.",2 Illinois precedent holds that courts should not interfere with the 
right of two parties to contract: "The rationale for this rule is that courts should not 
interfere with the right of two parties to contract with one another if they freely and 
knowingly enter into the agreement. ,,3 Thus, the general principle behind a valid 
exculpatory contract is the freedom of parties to contract in a manner that will provide the 
parties with the opportunity to meet their needs4 However, the right to contract alone is 
not enough to ensure that an exculpatory agreement will be enforced. 
Most courts have held that in order for an exculpatory agreement to be upheld, the 
agreement must clearly express the intent that one of the parties to the agreement 
knowingly agreed to release the other party of his or her negligence5 It should be noted 
that courts decide whether or not the releasor knowingly intended to release the maker of 
the exculpatory agreement by looking at all of the relevant circumstances surrounding the 
complaint; and the courts decide what the relevant circumstances are case by case. 
Therefore, a party to an action involving an exculpatory agreement cannot take for 
2HarriSY Walker, 119 III. 2d 542, 544, 519 N.E.2d 917, 919(1lI. Sup. Ct. 1988),
 
(quoting McClure Engineering Associates, Inc y Reuben H Donnelley Corp, 95 III. 2d
 
68,72,447 N.E.2d 400 (1lI. Sup. Ct. 1983)).
 
3Garrison y Combined Fitness Centre, 201 Ill. App. 3d 581, 584, 559 N.E.2d 187, 190
 
(I st Dist. 1990).
 
~ote, 1he Quality ofMercy: Charitable Torts and their Continuing Immunity, 100
 
HARV. L. REV. 1382, 1394 (1987).
 
. . 5Cadek y Great Lakes Dragaway, Inc, No. 93-C-1402, 843 F. Supp. 420, 422, 1994 
U.S. App. LEXIS 1163, at *6 (Northern District of Ill. Feb. 4, 1994). 
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granted that a court will hold the circumstances in the case at bar relevant, even if the 
circumstances resemble those of a previous case which the court held to be relevant. 
Typically, once an exculpatory clause has been worded with sufficient clarity, 
courts will not be concerned with a contracting party's awareness of the existence of the 
exculpatory clause. The only concern of the court will be whether the clause could have 
been reviewed by the releasor with no unusual difficulty6 This means that a party cannot 
exert as a defense that he or she did not read the exculpatory agreement before signing the 
agreement. Even if the releasor did not read the exculpatory contract, the court will only 
consider if the releasor would have been able to ascertain that the agreement indemnified 
the releasee had the releasor read the exculpatory contract. 
In addition, courts frequently uphold exculpatory clauses when the injury is one 
expressly covered by unmistakable language in the exculpatory clause. A Georgia 
Appellate court upheld an exculpatory clause in Hall v Gardens Servs , Inc, 332 S.E. 2d 
3, 5 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) where a bailor relieved himself ofliability from his own ordinary 
negligence, except when the negligence amounted to willful and wanton misconduct7 
The language of the before mentioned case is important in determining whether or not an 
exculpatory clause will be upheld by a court. The court in upholding Hall noted that the 
exculpatory contract expressly relieved the bailor from his own negligence. Exculpatory 
clauses that contain language expressly releasing the releasee of his or her own negligence 
effectively preclude the releasor from asserting that he or she was unaware that the 
contract released the maker of the contract ofhis or her own negligence. 
The language ofHall is also important in determining when a court will uphold an 
exculpatory agreement because the bailor noted that the exculpatory clause would not be 
6James Brook, Contractual Disclaimer andLimitation ofLiability Under The Law of 
New York, 49 BROOK. L. REV. 1,28 (1982). 
7Krystyna M. Carmel, The Equine Activity Liability Acts: A·Discussion of Those in 
Existence and Suggestions for a Model Act, 83 KY. LJ. 157, 169 (1994). 
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upheld if the injury resulted from negligence as a result ofwillful and wanton misconduct. 
The language contained in Hall that barred the bailor's relief from liability when the injury 
resulted from willful and wanton misconduct should be contained in all exculpatory 
clauses, as a court will not uphold an exculpatory contract that relieves a party ofwillful 
and wanton misconduct. 
Although it is highly recommended that an exculpatory clause expressly contain 
the phrase "own ordinary negligence" in order to adequately release the defendant of his 
or her liability, it is not always necessary for the exculpatory clause to contain said phrase, 
or even to contain the term "negligence:" "Although exculpatory contracts or clauses are 
subject to the general rule that they are to be construed most strongly against their maker, 
a specific reference to the maker's "negligence" or its cognates is not required. ,,8 
However, it is important to note that it is very helpful when the exculpatory agreement 
expressly states that the party is releasing others from negligence9 When the term 
"negligence" is not used, it is important that the exculpatory clause clearly establish the 
parties' intent preclude such liability. to 
Courts often refer to words that describe negligence without expressly containing 
the term as "magic words," and many courts are divided on whether an exculpatory clause 
is valid only when the term "negligence is included," or if the clause is valid when "magic 
words" are included. Given the division of courts on whether or not exculpatory clauses 
should contain the term "negligence" or if "magic words" will be sufficient to describe 
negligence, it is better to include "negligence" in the exculpatory clause than to risk not 
having the clause upheld. II 
8Larsen V Vic Tanny Intern, 130 III. App. 3d 574, 576,474 N.E.2d 729, 731 (5th Dist.
 
1984).
 
9Joseph H. King, Jr., Exculpatory Agreementsfor Volunteers in Youth Activities - The
 
Alternative to Nerj(registered) Tiddlywinks, 53 OIDO ST. LJ. 683,712 (1992).
 
. - 1<1<razek V Mountain Rivers Tours, Inc, 884 F.2d 163, 166 (4th CiT. 1989). 
1100nald P. Judges, OfRocks and Hard Places: The Value ofRisk Choice, 42 EMORY 
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Courts have consistently upheld that exculpatory clauses are effective in protecting 
one from liability of ordinary negligence, yet it is still important for the exculpatory 
agreement limiting the liability to contain clear language in describing the scope of 
activities that the exculpatory contract protects: "More specifically, such exculpatory 
agreements have been upheld in the context of parachuting activities where the language 
of the agreement sets forth in clear language the range of activities to which it applies." 12 
In Falkner v Hinckley Parachute Center, the Second District court of Illinois held that the 
exculpatory clause existing between Falkner and the Hinckley Parachute Center effectively 
precluded the administrator of Falkner's estate from bringing a wrongful death action 
against the parachute center. Falkner, a student of the Hinckley Parachute Center, fell to 
his death when the parachute provided for him by the parachute center became entangled 
and failed to slow his fall. 13 The court held in Falkner, that the accident which caused 
Falkner's death was well within the range of covered activities in the exculpatory contract: 
"We conclude that an accident of the type suffered by the decedent was within the scope 
of the exculpatory clause of the training agreement." 14 The exculpatory clause in Falkner 
clearly indemnified Hinckley Parachute Center from, 
any and all liability claims, demands or actions or causes of action whatsoever 
arising out of any damage, loss or injury to the Student or the Student's property 
while upon the premises or aircraft of the Hinckley Parachute Center, Inc. or 
while participating in any of the activities contemplated by the agreement, whether 
such loss, damage, or injury results from negligence of Hinckley Parachute Center, 
Inc. * * * or some other cause. (Emphasis added.)15 
L.J. I, 115 (1993).
 
12Falkner v Hinckley Parachute Center, 178 III. App. 3d 597, 560, 533 N.E.2d 941, 944
 
(2nd Dist. 1989).
 
13Falkner v Hinckley Parachute Center, 178 III. App. 3d at 599, 533 N.E.2d at 943.
 
14Falkner v Hinckley Parachute Center, 178 III. App. 3d at 561, 533 N.E.2d at 945.
 
15Falkner v Hinckley Parachute Center, 178 III. App. 3d at 601, 533 N.E.2d at 945.
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The court further held in Falkner that the parties to an exculpatory contract need 
not anticipate the precise action which causes injury, when the exculpatory clause, as the 
exculpatory clause in Falkner, contains broad language describing the covered activities. 16 
The court explained that the broad language of the release allowed Falkner to contemplate 
a wide range of risks that one could expect when jumping out of an airplane, including the 
risks of, "unsafe equipment, negligent instruction, and death." 17 As Falkner illustrates, the 
maker of an exculpatory agreement should be sure that the exculpatory agreement 
contains a range of protected activities from which the release from liability applies. 
In addition to the before mentioned exculpatory contracts which courts 
tend to uphold, courts are also likely to uphold exculpatory clauses relating to non­
essential activities and services, especially when the injured party is able to foresee the risk 
which caused the injury. Examples of non-essential activities and services include 
activities and services for entertainment. Non-essential activities include baseball, football, 
golf, tennis, swimming, and skydiving. Examples of non-essential services include the 
services of sport stadiums, amusement parks, exercise gyms, and country clubs. Courts 
are likely to uphold exculpatory clauses relating to non-essential activities and services 
especially when the injured party is able to foresee the risk which caused the injury. In 
order for the maker of an exculpatory contract to ensure that a court will be able to 
enforce the contract, the maker should make certain that the releasor is able to foresee a 
wide range of injuries from the context of the exculpatory contract. 
EXCULPATORY CLAUSES THAT COURTS REFUSE TO UPHOLD 
The courts are concerned with fairness when a party claims exemption from 
negligence because the parties have entered into an exculpatory clause. The courts will 
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been violated. Courts have noted that exculpatory clauses are not favored an will be 
strictly construed against the contracts maker: "More recently, we observed that 
exculpatory clauses are not favored and must be strictly construed against the benefiting 
party, particularly one who drafted the release." 18 The standards that a court applies to an 
exculpatory agreement in deciding whether or not to uphold the agreement include the 
standards of: public policy, unfair bargaining power, and lack of intent of a releasor to 
~ releasor of his or her liability. Courts will frequently refuse to uphold exculpatory 
clauses in violation of any of the before mentioned standards. 
Courts strictly refuse to uphold any exculpatory contract in violation ofpublic 
policy: "A contract which shifts the risks ofone's own negligence to another contracting 
party will be enforced unless it would be against settled public policy to do so or there is . 
something in the social relationship of the parties militating against upholding the 
agreement. ,,19 And although courts refuse to uphold any exculpatory agreement in 
violation of public policy, there is no one formula courts apply to determine when an 
exculpatory contract is in violation ofpublic policy. Courts have labeled certain types of 
exculpatory clauses as violating public policy. One such type of an exculpatory clause that 
courts have held violative of public policy, is one that most ofus are familiar with. The 
exculpatory agreement that I am referring to is the type which must be signed as a 
condition for participation in interscholastic athletic activities. In Washington, the Odessa 
and Seattle school districts required both the students and their parents to sign 
"standardized forms" releasing the school districts from any liability as a result of 
negligence arising out of the districts' athletic programs. Some of the parents 
unsuccessfully tried to strike the exculpatory clause from the agreement, and as a result 
18Hams y Walker, 119 Ill. 2d 542, 544, 519 N.E.2d 917, 919 (III. Sup. Ct. 1988). 
19Nikolic y Seidenberg, 242 Ill. app. 3d 96, 98-99, 610 N.E.2d 177, 179-80 (2nd Dist. 
1993). 
-7­
their children were not allowed to participate in the interscholastic athletic activities. 20 
This case was heard before the Washington Supreme Court. The Washington Supreme 
Court considered whether exculpatory clauses should be allowed as a condition for 
participation in interscholastic athletic activities, which was an issue of first impression in 
the state ofWasbington. The court held that exculpation clauses required as a condition 
for participation in interscholastic athletic activities "violated public policy and were 
therefore invalid. ,,21 
In addition to refusing to uphold an exculpatory clause violative of public policy, 
courts will also refuse to uphold an exculpatory clause in which one party has a superior 
bargaining power over the other party. For example, if a releasor is forced to sign an 
exculpatory agreement as a condition for receiving medical treatment, then the releasee 
has unfair bargaining power. The releasee holds an unfair bargaining power because the 
releasor must sign the exculpatory agreement in order to receive the medical treatment. 
Exculpatory agreements that must be signed as a condition for medical services will not be 
upheld for the reason of unfair bargaining power. 
Case law has further established that courts will not uphold exculpatory contracts 
when the general language of the contract does not accurately reflect the releasor's intent 
to absolve the releasee of his or her liability: "General language is not sufficient to 
indicate an intention to absolve a party from liability for negligence. ,,22 In Calarco v 
YMCA of Greater Metropolitan, the Second District court of Illinois held that if the 
language ofan exculpatory contract does not clearly show the intent of the releasor, then 
no inference shall be made from the contract to show an intent to release: "Other 
20Case Comment, Negligence-Exculpatory Clallses-School Districts Cannot contract Ollt
 
ofNegligence Liability in Interscholastic Athletics-Wagenblast v. Odessa School District,
 
I/O Wash. 2d 845, 758 P.2d 9681988), 102 HARV. L. REV. 729,730 (1989).
 
21id. at 730
 
- 22Calaraco V YMCA of Greater Metropolitan, 149 Ill. App. 3d 1037, 1042, SOl N.E.2d 
268, 273 (2nd Dist. 1986). 
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decisions have stated that a limit on liability for negligence will not be inferred unless such 
intention is clearly expressed and that the language of an agreement must clearly notifY the 
prospective releasor of the effect of signing the agreement. ..23 
In addition to courts holding general language insufficient to indicate intent, the 
courts also hold general language insufficient to indicate the covered activities of the 
exculpatory contract. For example, in Calarco v YMCA of Greater Metropolitan, the 
Second District court of Illinois refused to uphold the exculpatory contract in question as 
the language contained on the membership form was not explicit enough to relieve YMCA 
from liability for negligence resulting from the use of exercise equipment: 
The form does not contain a clear and adequate description of covered 
activities. Such as 'use of the said gymnasium or the facilities and equipment 
therof,' to clearly indicate that injuries resulting from negligence in maintaining the 
facilities or equipment would be covered by the release24 
Exculpatory contracts releasing a party from claims arising from willful conduct or 
gross negligence are completely void and will not be enforced.25 Most courts hold that 
exculpatory agreements cannot preclude a plaintiff's claims against a defendant for 
intentional torts, or for the more serious forms of negligence often resulting from willful, 
wanton, or reckless conduct: 
Generally, a release does not bar plaintiff's maintenance of an action 
alleging willful and wanton misconduct by the defendants. This rule is based on 
the determination that, as a matter of public policy, a plaintiff cannot exculpate or 
indemnifY a defendant for the defendant's willful or wanton acts26 
23Calaraco V YMCA of Greater Metropolitan, 149 III. App. 3d at 1042,501 N.E.2d at 
273.
 
24Calaraco v YMCA of Greater Metropolitan, 149 III. App. 3d at 1041,501 N.E.2d at
 
272.
 
25James Brook, Contrachlal Disclaimer and Limitation ofLiability Under the Law of
 
New York, 49 BROOK L. REV. 1,26 (1982).
 
26Downingv Ilnited Auto Racing Ass'n, 211 III. App. 3d 877, 885,570 N.E.2d 828, 836
 
(1st Dist. 1991).
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One example of a court allowing a cause of action in a willful and wanton 
negligence case is where a court allowed a plaintiff's estate to bring a claim against a 
defendant, for the defendant's reckless conduct, where the parties had previously entered 
into an exculpatory agreement. The defendant was a railroad company, and the plaintiff 
worked for a quarry which had an exculpatory agreement indemnifying the railroad 
company for liability to the quarry's employees as a result of the railroad company's own 
negligence. The quarry employee was killed at the site when a speeding train struck a 
wheelbarrow which was on the train track. As a result of the train striking the 
wheelbarrow, the wheelbarrow struck the employee with "enough force to cause fatal 
injuries."27 The appellate court held that train's striking of the wheelbarrow on the track 
to be willful and wanton negligence, as the train was speeding at the work site. The 
appellate court held that the exculpatory clause did not protect the railroad company from 
liability as a result ofwillful and wanton negligence, and remanded the case for a new trial. 
'l! '; Courts are also likely to refuse to uphold exculpatory clauses relating to activities 
,,~V~ services necessary to maintain a minimum standard of life, Courts generally will not ~~'(;l<; uphold exculpatory contracts relating to essential services. ~ssential services include 
" ...~V JJ housing services, medical services and utility services. Courts are concerned with fairness 
~jt1~~hen a public service corporation claims an exemption from negligence liability as a part 
.(.~:;;.I ~\ ~oftheir contract or schedule. This is because although the relationship between the public 
,~ 'l!Y service supplier and the customer is contractual; the customer is forced to enter into the 
\y' :t exculpatory contract in order to receive the services. Customers are forced to enter into 
exculpatory contracts with utility providers as there is usually only one provider of each 
public utility service in a given area. One such example of a court refusing to uphold anj;/ 
exculpatory agreement where the customer was forced to sign an exculpatory contract in 
27Karen M. Espaldon, Virginia's Rule ofNon-Waiver ofLiabilityfor Negligent Acts: 
, ,Hiett V. Lake Barcroft Community Association, Inc., 2 GEO. MASON.V. L. REV. 27, 37 
(1994). 
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/):,~~,?"d~" """" M ~=""' ~;"' i, f","", ;, ili, ,= ,rCon Ed, 407 N Yf;" 77~~ 
(N. Y.c. Civ. Ct.). In Con Ed the court refused to uphold an exculpatory agreement that 
provided "in case the supply of service shall be intenupted or irregular or defective or fail 
from causes beyond its control or through ordinary negligence of employees, servants, or 
agents the Company will not be liable therefor. ,,28 The court refused to uphold the 
exculpatory agreement in the before mentioned case as the customer was forced to sign 
the exculpatory agreement as a condition to receive an essential service. 
CONCLUSION 
Traditionally exculpatory agreements that have been upheld by courts expressly 
relieve the defendant of his or her "own ordinary negligence" by the use oflanguage 
clearly showing the releasor's intent to release the releasee of his or her liability. Courts 
have traditionally refused to uphold exculpatory agreements: where the agreement violates 
of public policy; where one party of the exculpatory contract holds an unfair bargaining 
power; where the agreement does not contain language clearly establishing the intent of 
the releasor to relieve the releasee of his or her "own ordinary negligence;" and where the 
injury is a result ofwillful or wanton misconduct or negligence. There is no one formula 
that courts use to apply to exculpatory agreements to decide whether they should be 
upheld or held to be invalid; and as a result, exculpatory contracts pose a dilemma for our 
courts and a problem for society. Exculpatory clauses pose a dilemma for the courts and a 
problem for society, as it is never clear under what circumstances a court will uphold or 
refuse to uphold an exculpatory contract. 
28James Brook, Contractual Disclaimer andLimitation ofLiability Under the Law of 
New York, 49 BROOK L. REV. 1,20-21 (1982). 
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